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TECHNIQUE FOR AUTHENTICATING H.264/SVC CODESTREAMS IN VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE APPLICATIONS
ABSTRACT
Surveillance codestreams coded by H.264/SVC (scalable video cod-
ing), which consists of one base layer and one or more enhancement
layers, supply flexible and various quality, resolution, and temporal
(sub)codestreams such that clients with different network bandwidth
and terminal devices can seamlessly access them. In this paper,
we present a robust authentication scheme for them in order to in-
sure the integrity of SVC surveillance codestreams, named AUSSC
(Authenticating SVC Surveillance Codestreams). AUSSC exploits
cryptographic-based authentication for base layer and content-based
authentication for enhancement layers. For content-based authen-
tication, AUSSC extracts full features from the first frame of each
GOP (group of picture) and partial features from “active” mac-
roblocks of other frames. Performance analysis indicates that
AUSSC is robust to content-preserving manipulations and sensitive
to content-changing manipulations of enhancement layers. Com-
pared with cryptographic-based and watermarking-based authenti-
cation schemes, experimental results show that AUSSC causes less
computation complexity and smaller compression overhead. Thus,
it appears that AUSSC is suitable for real time SVC surveillance ap-
plications.
Index Terms— H.264/SVC, Authentication, Surveillance appli-
cation
1. INTRODUCTION
The scalable extension of H.264, referred to as scalable video cod-
ing (SVC) [1], is composed of one base layer, which is compatible
with the H.264 advance video coding (AVC), and one or more en-
hancement layers which improve the video in one of three scalability
dimensions (time, quality and resolution). With video surveillance
becoming an integral part of our security infrastructure, the industry
is currently starting to use SVC to compress digital video for surveil-
lance applications such that clients with different network bandwidth
and terminal devices can seamlessly access various SVC surveil-
lance (sub)codestreams. For example, for a home SVC surveillance
system as shown in Figure 1, family members may take a look at
their home by mobile devices on their way home or view home
security by IPAD/laptop at public place (e.g., library). Moreover,
they can furthermore clearly check their home by computer at office.
However, under open network situations, any layer of SVC surveil-
lance codestreams can be modified by sophisticated processing tools
such that the surveillance content can be changed without leaving
any visible traces for human eyes. Therefore, surveillance data have
virtually no value as legal proofs since doubts would always exist.
Authentication scheme aims to thwart any unauthorized manip-
ulations by verifying the integrity and source of data. It has the stan-
dard requirements, e.g., security, computational efficiency and com-
munication efficiency. For authenticating SVC surveillance code-
streams, an authentication scheme should further satisfy the fol-
Fig. 1. An SVC home surveillance system.
lowing properties. Firstly, it preserves the scalability of the orig-
inal SVC surveillance codestreams. That is, it authenticates an
SVC codestream once at the source, but allows verification of three-
dimensional (sub)codestreams. Secondly, it is able to pinpoint the
tampered regions if tampering indeed occurred. In addition, it is ro-
bust or resilient to content-preserving manipulations which do not
change the semantic meaning of a codestream and it is able to detect
content-changing manipulations which modify the semantic mean-
ing of the codestream.
In this paper, we propose a novel authentication scheme for
SVC surveillance codestreams, named AUSSC (Authenticating SVC
Surveillance Codestreams), which integrates authentication opera-
tions into the SVC coding process. According to SVC layer char-
acteristic, base layer acts as the reference layer to quality/spatial en-
hancement layers. Due to the fact that base layer is the basement
of SVC codestreams, it must be transmitted to clients at any adap-
tation sessions. AUSSC exploits cryptographic-based authentication
for base layer codestream in case of any bit changing. It further
involves the authentication on temporal scalability since base layer
codestream contains frame order and time stamp. On the other hand,
qualtiy/spatial scalability supplements enhanced information for the
base layer in order to produce various higher quality/resolution im-
ages. Since those images have the same content as the original im-
ages used by encoders, AUSSC can take content-based features ex-
tracted from original images to authenticate qualtiy/spatial scalabil-
ity. We name the first frame of a GOP as key-frame while other
frames of the GOP as non-key frames. With hierarchical predic-
tion proerty, AUBBS extracts full features of key-frames but only
“partial” features from “active” macroblocks of non-key frames.
Analysis indicates that AUSSC is secure and can preserve three-
dimensional SVC scalabilities. Compared with other authentication
schemes, experimental results show that AUSSC causes the least
communication overhead.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We review ex-
isted authentication algorithms of SVC codestreams in Section 2 and
present preliminary in Section 3. Then, AUSSC is explained in Sec-
tion 4. Experiments and analysis are given in Section 5. At last, we
draw our conclusion in Section 6.
2. RELATEDWORKS
Authentication schemes for SVC codestreams can be classi-
fied into three major types: cryptographic-based authentication,
watermarking-based authentication and content-based authentica-
tion.
Cryptographic-based authentication scheme Cryptographic-
based authentication is generally to perform compression first, and
then authentication. For instance, Yu in [2] and Mokhtarian et al. in
[3] proposed similar hash chain schemes for SVC codestreams. The
schemes hash each enhancement layer and attach the hash value to
the lower layer of the same frame. Cryptographic-based authentica-
tion schemes are very sensitive to content modifications, including
content-changing manipulations, content-preserving manipulations
and bit errors caused by transmission or storage noise. Proposed
schemes are also not transparent to users because they totally de-
pend on the SVC layer structure. Furthermore, since they must exe-
cute hash function for each layer, their computation complexity and
communication overhead are proportional to the number of layers.
Watermarking-based authentication scheme Watermarking-
based authentication embeds a reference object, e.g., image or
message, into an SVC codestream. Grois et al. in [4] reviewed
recent watermarking-based authentication schemes for SVC. As the
reference object and the SVC codestream are mixed together, the
embedded object will be tampered as long as the SVC codestream
is maliciously tampered. For example, Meerwald and Uhl in [5]
designed a robust watermarking-based authentication by embedding
the same watermark into both base layer and enhancement layers
for quality/spatial scalability. For the sake of robustness and
security, watermarking-based authentication schemes must embed
the reference object into each layer of SVC. Otherwise, the non-
watermarked layers can be easily tampered without being detected.
Moreover, the capacity of embedding watermarking is very limited
in enhancement layers because most quantized coefficients of
enhancement layers are equal to zero.
Content-based authentication scheme Content-based authentica-
tion [6] separates from compression. It ensures the authenticity of
multimedia features such as edges, the feature of Matrix transform,
and the feature of transform domain. To authenticate a codestream,
a content provider extracts its multimedia features, generates a ref-
erence object with the extracted features, and delivers the reference
object to end users via a secure channel. Upon receiving the video
codestream and the reference object, an end user extracts the video
features as the provider did, and checks whether the extracted fea-
tures match those in the reference object. In such schemes, they
have their own robustness range for content-preserving and content-
changing manipulations [6] so as to satisfy authentication require-
ments of general multimedia, such as MPEG series and H.264. How-
ever, since SVC codestreams can supply various quality and resolu-
tion images, especially, the lowest quality of SVC codestreams is
outside robustness range of features, content-based authentication
fails to simultaneously protect both base layer and enhancement lay-
ers.
3. NMF-NMF-SQ
The NMF (Non-negative Matrix Factorization) algorithm [7] is able
to decompose a non-negative matrix into two non-negative matrix
factors. Monga and Mihcak in [8] proposed a robust and secure im-
age hashing methods, named NMF-NMF-SQ hashing, as follows.
 Given an image I, pseudorandomly select p overlapping
subimages Ai with sizemm, 1  i  p;
 Perform a rank r1 NMF transform on each subimage (r1 
m), Ai  Wi  FTi , whereWi and Fi arem r1 matrices,
FTi is the transpose of Fi;
 Randomly arrange the matrices Wi and Fi into a new image
J with sizem 2pr1;
 Perform a rank r2 NMF transform on J, J  W  H, where
the size ofW ism r2 and the size of H is r2  2pr1;
 Concatenate the columns of W with the rows of H as a hash
vector h. Denote the length of h as v;
 Generate pseudorandom weight vectors ftigui=1 (u  v) with
a secret ke, where each ti is the length of v. Let Vi = hh; tii
be the inner product of vector h and vector ti. The hash is
fV1;    ; Vug.
NMF-NMF-SQ is very robust to a large class of perceptually
insignificant manipulations. For example, it can tolerate the JPEG
compression with quality factor QF = 1% [6]. As H.264/SVC uti-
lizes a similar integer Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) as the JPEG
standard, the robustness property is conjectured to be applicable to
H.264/SVC codestream too [9]. Based on the tampering detection
dataset CASIA [10], our experimental results on H.264 codestreams
indicate that NMF-NMF-SQ indeed keeps excellent robustness and
sensitivity property when QP (quantization parameter) of an image
is no more than 38.
4. AUTHENTICATION AND VERIFICATION
AUSSC seamlessly integrates authentication/verification operation
into the SVC coding process.
4.1. Authentication
AUSSC takes use of cryptographic-based authentication to guaran-
tee the integrity and authenticity of base layer and utilizes content-
based authentication to ensure enhancement layers. Figure 2 illus-
trates the flow of authentication of an SVC codestream.
4.1.1. Authentication of base layer
Given the encoded frame , the provider takes its base layer b and
a key kb shared by provider and receiver as input to produce MAC 
as
 = H(kb;b) (1)
where H() is a standard one-way hash function (e.g., SHA-1).
AUSSC takes use of SEI (Supplement Enhancement Information)
NALU to encapsulates the hash, which is the same method as the
one in [3]. Each AU (Access Unit) owns its SEI NALU.
Fig. 2. The flow of authentication.
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Fig. 3. Hierarchical prediction structure of SVC temporal scalability.
4.1.2. Authentication of enhancement layers
In order to authenticate SVC enhancement layers, AUSSC extracts
content-based features from original images, which may be full fea-
tures of key-frames or partial features of non-key frames as shown
in Figure 2.
Full features of key-frame Since key-frames are the most impor-
tant reference frames and always act as synchronous frames, AUSSC
exploits NMF-NMF-SQ hash to extracts full features from original
images which should be of the same resolution as base layer does.
As NMF-NMF-SQ requirements, a pseudorandom weight vectors
ftigui=1 (u  v) should be generated in order to compress the hash
vector h by inner product. In this article, we utilize RC4 which
takes the secret key ke and an IV (initial vector) as input to gen-
erate ftigui=1 (u  v) for each key-frame. AUSSC chooses the slice
header of base layer as IV. The inner product’s result is NMF-NMF-
SQ hash vector, named V . Its length is u and each element occupies
12 bits. At last, V is written into its SEI NALU.
Partial feature of non-key frame With the hierarchical prediction
structure of SVC temporal scalability as shown in Figure 3, AUSSC
authenticates the non-key frames one by one. Firstly, AUSSC au-
thenticates the non-key frame f11 . Then, higher temporal layers’
non-key frames, e.g., f12 , f22 , which take use of key-frames and/or
the authenticated non-key frames as reference frames are authenti-
cated. Analogously, the highest temporal layer’s non-key frames,
e.g., f13 , f23 , f33 and f43 , are gradually processed. Different from
extracting full features of key-frames, AUSSC only extracts partial
features from “active” fields of non-key frames in order to reduce
its computation complexity and communication overhead. Because
adjacent frames normally have lots of non-changing fields inside a
GOP, especially for surveillance applications, that is, the correspond-
ing fields have the same content among those frames. As a conse-
quence of the fact that the integrity of reference frames have been
authenticated, the non-changing fields of current non-key frame can
also be authenticated.
In AUSSC, an “active” field corresponds to a 16  16 mac-
roblock which is the coding unit of H.264 and can be judged by
SVC base layer’s encoding information, such as code mode and cbp
(coded block pattern). cbp’s value of a macroblock indicates if there
are 4  4 subblocks which contain non-zero coefficients (i.e., pre-
diction residuals). In AUSSC, Intra period must be greater or equal
to GOP size, hence only P/B can be the non-key frame. Given a
non-key frame (i.e., P/B frame) and one of its macroblock, we judge
“active” or “static” as follows. If code mode is Intra mode or PCM
mode, the macroblock coding is independent of reference frames.
Thus, the macroblock must be authenticated alone, then AUSSC sets
it as “active” one; if code mode is Direct/Skip mode, the macroblock
is coded without sending residual error or motion vector. Hence, de-
coders can directly reconstruct it based on reference frames, then
AUSSC sets it as “static” one; if code mode is Inter mode, when cbp
is non-zero, AUSSC sets it as “active” one, otherwise, AUSSC sets
it as “static” one because the content of macroblock or its subblocks
can be found from reference frames based on mvs. For the Hall
SVC codestream, it contains one base layer (QP40, CIF) and two
quality enhancements (QP30 and QP20, CIF). Figure 4 illustrates
the detection results of “active” macroblocks.
Assuming a non-key frame has M of “active” macroblocks,
AUSSC takes the following steps to authenticate them. Firstly, 256
pixels of each “active” macroblock are permutated by a pseudoran-
dom sequence. Let Eke() be the permutation algorithm. Denote
B = fb0;    ; b255g an “active” macroblock. To permute B using
ke, the sender determines a permutation function n : [0; n  1] !
[0; n  1] as follows.
Step 1. Compute C = fc0; c1;    ; cn 1g where ci = Eke(i; R)
for 0  i  n  1, and R is a string related to slice header of
base layer and frame number.
Step 2. Sort the n ciphertexts in the ascending order, such that
ci0 < ci1 <    < cin 1 , where 0  ij < n.
Step 3. Define n(ij) = i. In other words, ci is replaced with cij .
n is a secure pseudo-random permutation if an encryption algo-
rithm (e.g., AES) is used. Secondly, M of encrypted “active” mac-
roblocks are reorganized into a new subimage A1 (16  16 M ).
Thirdly, AUSSC performs NMF on A1 with rank r1 in order to pro-
duce two matrixes: 16 r1 and r1 16 M , then reorganizes them
into a new subimage A2 (16  (M + 1)r1). At last, AUSSC fur-
ther performs NMF on A2 with rank r2 and produces two matrixes:
16r2 and r2 (M+1)r1. The concatenation of columns of these
two matrixes gives the features of non-key frames, named Va, which
is also an input to the SEI NALU.
4.2. Verification
After receiving an SVC (sub)codestream, if it contains both base
layer and enhancement layers, AUSSC should verify base layer and
enhancement layer of the received (sub)codestream as shown in Fig-
ure 5.
Fig. 4. Detection of “active” macroblocks.
 
~
V
Fig. 5. The flow of verification.
4.2.1. Verification of base layer
For the base layer	b of a frame	, AUSSC first calculates its MAC
value  as
 = H(kb;	b): (2)
If  = , AUSSC framework accepts the base layer’s codestream.
It further involves the authentication on temporal scalability because
the time stamp and frame number are authenticated by MAC, hence,
AUSSC can detect frame reordering attack in which the temporal
order of frames may be changed. Otherwise, the codestream of the
base layer is tampered and AUSSC directly rejects the base layer and
all the enhancement layers of 	.
4.2.2. Verification of enhancement layer
In order to verify received enhancement layers, AUSSC utilizes two
different content-based authentication techniques for key-frame and
non-key frame.
Verification of key-frame AUSSC takes NMF-NMF-SQ hash to
verify the feature integrity of a key-frame. As what the provider
does, with the shared key ke, the receiver extracts feature ~V from the
key-frame decoded from base layer and the received enhancement
layers. If the received codestream contains spatial enhancement lay-
ers, the key-frame should be downsampled before feature extraction.
AUSSC calculates the error e =k ~V   V k. If e satisfies robustness
range of content-based feature, the key-frame is accepted; otherwise,
it is regarded as modified one and AUSSC directly reject the GOP.
The detail of detection theoretic analysis and the probability of miss
and false alarm can be found in reference [8].
Verification of non-key frame Based on the hierarchical predic-
tion structure, AUSSC furthermore verifies received non-key frames
one by one. If the received base layer’s codestream is accepted, its
coding information (i.e., code mode and cbp) are verified. AUSSC
takes the same method as shown in Subsection 4.1.2 to differenti-
ate “active” macroblocks from “static” macroblocks. If a received
SVC codestream contains spatial enhancement layers, the resolu-
tion of non-key frames should be downsampled to the same as
base layer’s in order to locate “active” macroblocks. After detec-
tion of “active” macroblocks, AUSSC extracts partial features ~Va
with the same way as shown in Subsection 4.1.2. The distance
ea =k ~Va   Va k indicates if “active” macroblocks are modi-
fied. On the other hand, since “static” macroblocks do not contain
residuals, the same content of the macroblock (e.g., code mode is
MODE SKIP or MODE 16  16) or its subblocks (e.g., code
mode isMODE 168,MODE 816 orMODE 88) can be
found in reference frames based on mvs. In order to verify “static”
macroblocks, AUSSC performs the subtraction of “static” subblocks
and corresponding subblocks of reference frames to verify content
integrity. Our experiments on Hall sequence indicate that results of
all pairs of pixel substraction approximate to zero.
Table 1. Communication overhead (bytes)
quality scalability spatial scalability
original key-frame no-key frame overhead original key-frame no-key frame overhead
length % length %
Hall 1661133 4978 18171 1.39 1583646 3154 11253 0.91
38 key frames (M = 6048) (M = 3742)
Bridge-close 4652164 8253 38919 1.01 4391955 5229 13749 0.43
63 key frames (M = 12964) (M = 4574)
Bridge-far 2583726 8253 1911 0.39 2521044 5229 393 0.22
63 key frames (M = 628) (M = 122)
5. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
The experiments on Ubuntu 10.04 are carried out on a PC with
2.53GHz Intel dual-core processor. We choose Bridge-far (500
frames), Bridge-close (500 frames), and Hall (300 frames) se-
quences as our experiments, which are encoded into SVC code-
streams by JSVM 9.19 [11]. We set GOP size and Intra period as
8, and the QP s of enhancement layers are no more than 38. For
quality scalability experiments, the encoded SVC codestreams con-
tain three layers (i.e.,QP40,QP30, andQP20, CIF(352288)), and
u is set as 64. For spatial scalability experiments, the encoded SVC
codestreams consist of one base layer (QP40, QCIF (176144)) and
two enhancement layers (QP35 and QP20, CIF), and u is set as 32.
In addition, the parameters of NMF-NMF-SQ are p = 10,m = 50,
r1 = 2, and r2 = 1 for QCIF. We design our experiments based on
NMFlib1, and exploit nmf alspg (alternating least squares using a
projected gradient method) to compute the factorization.
Security AUSSC inputs kb and b and outputs an MAC which en-
sures that a receiver who knows the secret key kb can detect any
changes to the base layer. On the other hand, besides the base
layer, SVC codestreams also supply various quality and resolution
(sub)codestreams to clients using different enhancement layers. For
key-frames, as required by the NMF-NMF-SQ algorithm, uftigui=1
pseudorandom weight vectors are generated using RC4 with the se-
cret key ke and an initialization vector IV. When a stream ciphers
such as RC4 is used, the initialization vector IV should be unique
for each AU such that the resulting pseudorandom vectors do not
repeat themselves. In AUSSC, IV is generated as
IV = F(Hn;Hs): (3)
where F is a one-way function, Hn represents the SVC scalable in-
formation (e.g., temporal identifier), andHS denotes the slice header
of base layer which is protected by MAC. Because the header infor-
mation is in clear text, IV can be deduced from the SVC codestream
at the decoder/verifier side. For non-key frames, the pseudo-random
permutations of “active” macroblocks are generated using a block ci-
pher such as AES. It’s well known that block ciphers can be regarded
as secure pseudo-random permutations and it is computationally in-
feasible to distinguish the output of a block cipher from that of a
truly random permutation [12]. This implies that an attacker can not
forge Va without the knowledge of the secret key for the block ci-
pher, although the attacker know the content of macroblocks from
base layer.
Computation complexity Authentication computation cost of
AUSSC consists of base layer’s authentication cost tb and enhance-
ment layer’s authentication cost te. te can be key-frame cost tke
1http://www.ee.columbia.edu/ grindlay/code.html
and non-key frame cost tne . tb is MAC computation cost. Usually,
tb  te and can be omitted. For tke , according to [8],
tke = p  o(m2r1) + o(2mpr1r2) + o(mr2 + 2pr1r2): (4)
where the first term is the rank r1 NMF cost on p mm matrices,
the second term is the rank r2 NMF cost on m  2pr1 matrix, and
the third term is due to pseudorandom statistics obtained from the
resulting NMF-NMF vector of length mr2 + 2pr1r2. For instance,
experimental results of spatial scalability show that the three terms
in Eqn. 4 are 3464.5 s, 210 s, and 62.84 s, respectively. Then,
tke is 3737.34 s. As for tne , it is related to the number M , and can
be calculated as follows,
tne = eM + o(16M16r1) + o(16(M + 1)r1r2): (5)
Where eM is the sum of permutation time for all “active” mac-
roblocks, it can be ignored because it is far less than the second and
third items; the second item is the rank r1 NMF cost on 16M  16;
the third item is the rank r2 NMF cost on 16  (M + 1)  r1. For
example, if M is equal to 20, the second and third items of Eqn. 5
are 1402 s and 270 s, respectively. Therefore, tne is 1672 s.
On the other hand, verification is an inverse way of authentica-
tion, its cost should contain tb, tke , and tne . In addition, the computa-
tion cost tse of verifying “static” macroblocks also should be added.
For example, with M being 20, tse of QCIF are about 64.63 s and
129.26 s for a P frame and for a B frame, respectively.
Compression overhead Communication overhead of each AU is
l = lb + le + lh bytes, where lb denotes a fixed-length overhead for
base layer authentication, le is the size of the enhancement layers
features, and lh is the header size for an SEI. Typically, we select
lb = 16 and lh = 19, hence,
l = 16 + le + 19 = 35 + le: (6)
le can be the size of key frame’s features lke or non-key frame’s fea-
tures lne . Table 1 describes the experimental results of quality and
spatial scalabilities. The first column indicates that there are 38 of
key-frames for Hall and 63 key-frames for Bridge-close and Bridge-
far. The second and sixth columns show the length of original SVC
codestreams. The third and seventh columns describe compression
overhead of key-frames, where lke is 131 bytes (i.e., lke = 96) for
quality scalability and 83 bytes lke = 48 for spatial scalability. The
fourth and eighth columns show the value ofM and the communica-
tion overhead caused by non-key frames for quality and spatial scal-
ability. The fifth and ninth columns give the communication over-
head in the form of percentage. As a result, the average overhead of
quality and spatial scalabilities are 0.93% and 0.52%.
ScalabilityWhen users only receive base layer codestream, AUSSC
verify it by cryptographic-based authentication. When users further
Table 2. Comparison with other H.264/SVC authentication schemes
robustness/sensitivity tampered authentication dependence on communication
location operation SVC structure overhead
Cryptographic sensitive to no all layer yes quality scalability 2.19%
authentication any bit change hash spatial scalability 2.62%
Watermarking semi-fragile yes all layer yes quality scalability 8.66%
authentication watermarking spatial scalability 2.93%
AUSSC sensitive to base layer change yes base layer hash no quality scalability 0.93%
robust to enhancement layers content-based features spatial scalability 0.52%
receive different quality and/or spatial enhancement layers, AUSSC
verify them by content-based authentication. Therefore, AUSSC
preserves the scalability of the original SVC surveillance code-
streams.
Robustness and sensitivity The base layer is authenticated by
cryptographic-based authentication, thus AUSSC is sensitive to any
bits changing. On the other hand, AUSSC authenticates the content-
based features to ensure integrity of enhancement layers. Because
the features are robust to content-preserving manipulations and sen-
sitive to content-changing manipulations. Therefore, transcoding on
enhancement layers, e.g., reducing bit-rates/resolution of SVC code-
streams, can still be accepted, however, the content-changing opera-
tions on enhancement layers can be rejected.
5.1. Comparison with other authentication schemes
As AUSSC exploits the characteristics of SVC to ensure its authen-
ticity, it is robust to content-preserving manipulations but sensitive to
content-changing manipulations for enhancement layers. However,
cryptographic-based authentication is sensitive to any bit change of
SVC and watermarking-based is semi-fragile to content-preserving
manipulations. In other words, AUSSC achieves a good balance be-
tween robustness and sensitivity as shown in the second column of
Table 2. The third column indicates that cryptographic-based au-
thentication can not locate tampered areas. Furthermore, the fourth
column of Table 2 shows that AUSSC only depends on base layer
and content-based features of the highest quality/resolution images,
while cryptographic-based authentication and watermarking-based
authentication must involve every layer of SVC to prevent the attacks
on unprotected layers. In the fifth column of Table 2, cryptographic-
based authentication and watermarking-based authentication depend
on layer prediction relationship of SVC in order to construct hashing
chain or embed watermarking. AUSSC is independent of SVC struc-
ture since AUSSC only considers the authentication of base layer’s
codestream and content-based features of SVC. Hence AUSSC is
transparent to users. The last column illustrates the communication
overhead. In our SVC experiments, GOP size is 8 and encoded SVC
sequences have three layers (one base layer and two enhancement
layers). The cryptographic-based authentication [3] appends 960
bytes overhead per GOP (i.e., each frame has 120 bytes overhead).
Hence, the average overheads of the scheme in [3] are 2.19% and
2.62% of the original codestream for quality and spatial scalability,
respectively. In general, AUSSC produces the smallest communica-
tion overhead as shown at the last column of Table 2. In addition,
AUSSC’s communication overhead is constant, while the counter-
parts of cryptographic-based authentication [3] and watermarking-
based authentication [5] increase with the number of enhancement
layers. For example, with GOP size being 8, each frame will carry
40 bytes more overhead in [3] when an SVC sequence contains one
more enhancement layer.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a robust authentication scheme for SVC
surveillance codestreams, named AUSSC. According to the charac-
teristics of SVC architecture, AUSSC exploited cryptographic-based
and content-based authentication techniques for base layer and qual-
ity/resolution enhancement layers, respectively. Based on the hier-
archical structure of temporal scalability, AUSSC extracted full fea-
tures of key frame while only partial features of non-key frames. Our
experimental results showed that AUSSC caused less compression
overhead than cryptographic-based and watermarking-based authen-
tication, and had low computation complexity. Thus, it appears that
AUSSC is suitable for real time SVC surveillance applications. In
addition, it can be robust to content-preserving manipulations and
sensitive to content-changing manipulations, and it can further lo-
cate tempered fields.
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